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INTRODUCTION
Japanese competition law is centered around the Anti-
monopoly Act (AMA) which was enacted in 1947. But
during its rather long history, its status as the fundamental
law for an economic order has not been secured. If we look
at the year, 1947, it was the time when Japan was occupied
by the US after WWII. As a result of this, the AMA was
modeled after US antitrust law and its content seems
similar to the US style, but its enforcement over the years
has been different. The concept “competition is good” was
unfamiliar to Japanese society at that time, and so it took
time for society to accept this act.
This article looks at the Act’s history, its content, and its
enforcement.
HISTORY OF THE AMA
Background to the Act
Modernization of Japan
In order to really understand the background of the
AMA, we need to go back to the modernization of Japan,
which started around 1868. At that time, the Japanese
government was surprised to see the high level of
technology and power in Europe and the US, and became
worried about colonization. So, it adopted “catch up”
policies which introduced many new laws, mainly modeled
on the German example. The government introduced
technology from foreign countries and helped industry
grow.
Before and during World War II
Before and during WWII, Japanese economy had two
main problems in terms of its competition policy. The first
problem was that of concentration. A handful of
conglomerated groups called “zaibatsu” controlled the
whole Japanese economy. The Zaibatsu groups grew by
cooperating with the government and used holding
companies to control a lot of large and influential
companies in important industries.
The second problem was that of cartels. In order to
control economic activity leading up to the war, the
government did not only permit cartels among
competitors, but used them to their own advantage by
creating private controlling associations in each industry
and letting them control the products and prices of their
members.
Occupation policy after World War II
After WWII Allied forces occupied Japan, they carried
out their occupation policy of “economic
democratization”. This policy included drastic reform.
Land was taken away from landlords and given to the
farmers, and trade unions were legalized. In industry,
zaibatsu groups were dismantled, several big companies
were subdivided, and private controlling associations were
dissolved. After all those structural measures, the Anti-
monopoly Act was enacted to keep the democratic
economy in order.
Development
The AMA lost ground for the first half of its history, and
then it gathered momentum and is actively enforced today.
Its history can be divided into four periods: retreat,
reassessment, amendment and active enforcement.
Retreat
During the first few years, the AMA was enforced
actively because the occupation forces were still in Japan,
but the situation changed with Japan’s independence. The
recovery of industry was given top priority, and for this
purpose the government used the old familiar technique.
The AMA was amended to allow depression cartels and
rationalization cartels. Even in the time of depression,
output cartels found it difficult to succeed because of
coordination problems and cheating. Therefore, the MITI
(Ministry of International Trade and Industry) advised
producers to reduce their output, and in practice
coordinated cartels. In the 1960s, Japanese business faced
the threat of liberalization of capital and trade. In order to
compete with big foreign companies, government
encouraged many mergers.
In this climate, the competition authority could not play
an active role in cartel and merger control. However, the
competition authority found its way in the field of
consumer protection and protection of small companies
from their big trading partners.
Reassessment
The AMA was presented with two opportunities to
further the interests of consumers in general. The first
chance was the so-called False Beef Can case in 1960. A
consumer bought a can of cooked beef, and found a fly
inside. She complained to the company but it didn’t
respond properly. She then complained to the authority. It
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was found that the beef can contained not only a fly but
also whale meat instead of beef. Similar beef cans were
checked and revealed to contain whale or horse meat. The
public realised that misrepresentation was widespread, and
this caused an outcry from consumers. There was no
appropriate law to regulate such conduct: however, the
AMA could apply, because it prohibits unfair trade
practices, which include deceptive enticement like
misrepresentation. Consumers started to realize that the
AMA could protect them from disreputable marketing
methods.
The second chance was through recognition and action
against cartels. In the early 1970s an oil crisis triggered
hyperinflation, which became a social issue. It was revealed
that the culprit of the inflation was not only the oil crisis,
but also secret cartels among competitors. The public then
realized that cartels were detrimental to consumers and the
economy, and government and public started to look at the
AMA as a potential weapon against cartels and inflations.
Amendment to strengthen
The AMA’s long period of declining influence was finally
reversed. Because of the above two events, and the increase
of market concentration, consumers and small business
(and agriculture) started supporting the AMA. Then in
1977, for the first time in its history, the AMA was
amended to strengthen its content and enforcement. The
main improvement was the introduction of a surcharge
system against cartels (which is explained in more detail
later). However, the enforcement was found to be
inadequate: there was only one criminal case before 1990,
which concerned oil cartels among oil refining companies
during the oil crisis.
Pressure for active enforcement
In 1989–90, Japan and the US government had a
discussion whose main purpose was to open the Japanese
market and uncover potential obstacles. The Japanese
government promised actively to enforce the AMA. After
that, the government started to use criminal sanctions
more, but the level of prosecution was only about one
every two years.
CONTENT OF THE AMA
Purpose
The purpose of the Act is described in section 1, and is
to promote free and fair competition. Through this, it
purports to to “promote democratic and wholesome
development of the national economy” and to “assure the
interest of consumers in general”.
Prohibited conduct
In order to achieve this purpose, the AMA prohibits
certain conduct by undertakings and controlling
concentrations, such as those resulting from mergers (I
have not covered controlling concentrations in this article).
There are three main types of prohibited conduct: private
monopolization, cartels and unfair trade practices.
Private monopolization ( sections 2(5),3)
The prohibition of private monopolization is similar to
Article EC82 (abuse of dominant position). There are
mainly two tests for this category. The first test is its market
effect; whether it substantially restrains competition (in
any particular field of trade). The second test is conduct;
whether it controls or excludes other entrepreneurs. The
third test is whether it is contrary to the public interest. I
will consider the third test later, in cartels.
If you compare this with Article EC82, a dominant
position is not required. However, in enforcement, private
monopolization is applied only to undertakings with a high
market share. And in fact, there are only a few cases of
private monopolization. This is because most exclusionary
conduct or abusive conduct is covered by the third
category, unfair trade practices whose requirements are
much easier to meet.
Unreasonable restraint of trade (Cartel) (sections 2(6),3)
In the AMA, cartels are caught under unreasonable
restraint of trade. Its prohibition is similar to Article EC81
(collusion). There are mainly two tests. The first test is its
market effect, and is the same as private monopolization.
The second test is the type of conduct, and whether it is a
contract or agreement. The third test is the same as private
monopolization – whether it is contrary to the public
interest.
Compared with Article EC81, there are some
differences. First, there is no Article EC81 (2), and cartel
contracts are not automatically void. Second, there is no
Article EC81 (3). However there is the third test;
“contrary to the public interest”. If you interpret this key
phrase broadly as one of justification, many cartels which
restrict competition can be allowed (case law does not
allow such wide interpretation.) Third, the case law has
interpreted that “unreasonable restraint of trade” covers
horizontal restraints only. Most vertical restraint is covered
by the unfair trade practices.
Unfair trade practices (sections 2(9),19)
The first test of “unfair” is its effect and whether it tends
to impede fair competition. As I mentioned, this test is
much easier than the test for the other two categories. The
second test is for types of conduct. The AMA defines broad
types of conduct and leaves the detail to be designated by
the competition authority. Unfair trade practices include
many types of conduct, which will be explained in more
detail later.
Let us go back to the first test. Which types of conduct
can be said to “impede fair competition”? This test does
not necessarily require market definition, and there are
three aspects to it:26
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1. Conduct which impedes fair competition by impeding
free competition (eg RPM, territorial restriction, price
discrimination, and refusal to deal).
2. Conduct which impedes fair competition through
unfair competitive methods (eg predatory pricing,
tying, and deceptive enticement by misrepresentation
or excessive premiums).
3. Conduct which impedes fair competition because it
impedes the basic structure of free competition (eg
abuse of dominant bargaining position).
ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMA
In order to enforce the AMA, the Japan Fair Trade
Commission (JFTC) was created and modeled after the US
FTC. (It has one chairperson and four commissioners. It
carries out its duty independently. Its decisions are made
by majority vote. The commission has three powers;
administrative power, quasi-judicial power, and quasi-
legislative power).
The AMA has three enforcement measures;
administrative measures by the JFTC, civil remedies, and
criminal sanctions. The feature of the enforcement in
Japan is that the JFTC plays the central role. It takes not
only administrative measures but also plays an important
role in civil remedies and criminal sanctions.
Administrative measures
Administrative measures are the most important
measures. The JFTC can issue two types of orders. The
first is the “cease and desist” order, to stop illegal conducts.
The second is the “payment of surcharge” order. This
order can be issued only in cases of certain cartels and is
used usually after the first order. The amount of surcharge
is calculated by multiplying the sale of the product in issue
by certain rates. In cases of big manufacturers, the rate is
6%. (In cases of small companies, or wholesaler or retailers
lower rates are applied). The central feature of the
surcharge system in Japan is that the JFTC does not have
discretion to reduce or increase the amount according to
how cooperative the breaching company is, or how severe
the cartel is. There is a reason for this.
As I explained earlier, the surcharge system was
introduced in 1977. At that time, the AMA already
contained claims for damages and a fine as a criminal
sanction. The surcharge should not be a sanction because
constitutional law prohibits double jeopardy. Therefore,
the nature of the surcharge was planned solely to repeal
illegally gained profits made by cartels, and the upper rate
of the surcharge was set at 6%. The amount of surcharge is
just an assumed profit (maybe much smaller than the real
profit) and not high enough to restrain cartels effectively.
The surcharge is not therefore, a sanction, as the amount
does not change according to such factors as whether the
company is a market leader, or whether it co-operates with
investigators.
Procedures and appeal
As a formal procedure, the JFTC makes decisions to
issue the above orders after the hearing procedure, which
is similar to a trial. The decisions of the commission are
subject to judicial review by the Tokyo High Court and can
possibly reach as high as the Supreme Court. The third
party does not have standing to appeal the decision of the
JFTC.
Civil remedies
There are two types of remedies within the AMA;
damage claims and actions for injunction.
Damages (section 25)
The AMA has a special damage claim system, which
reduces the burden of proof. The plaintiff does not have to
prove willful conduct or negligence, and therefore the
defendants cannot escape from liability by claiming that
they are not willful or negligent. Such special damage
claims are only available after the JFTC has made a
decision.
This system appears to help private damages suits, but in
reality has not been very supportive. One reason is that
courts adopted very stringent requirements concerning
proof of damage and causation, and in the case of the oil
cartels mentioned earlier ,consumers brought actions but
failed.
Recently, there have been two pieces of good news. First,
the civil case procedure act was amended to ease the proof
of damages. Thanks to this, a victim of a cartel won their
damage suit. Second, the JFTC announced its new policy
to help civil damage suits, so damage claims can be
expected to increase in the future.
Injunction (section 24)
In 2000, the AMA was amended to introduce a new
injunction system. Persons who suffer or probably suffer
“substantial damage” (from breach of the AMA) can take
an action for an injunction. The important point here is
that plaintiffs do not have to wait until the JFTC takes
action.
However, there are limits for this injunction system.
First, an injunction is limited only for unfair trade
practices, such as refusal to deal, predatory pricing and
tying. Second, consumer groups are not given standing.
Thus, the effectiveness of the injunction system is not clear
so far.
Criminal sanctions?
Cartels and private monopolization are subject to the
following three categories of criminal sanctions:
1. Individuals can face a fine up to £25,000 pounds and
imprisonment for up to three years. 27
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2. Companies can face a fine up to £500,000.
3. Company representatives can face a fine up to £25,000
pounds if they knew illegal conduct took place and did
not take any measures to stop it.
The third has never been used, because it is very difficult
to prove that the representative had knowledge of the
illegal conducts. However, there is one non-criminal
sanction, which applies to the representatives. If you are
the president of very big company, you might be a
candidate for the Medal of Honor from the government.
But, if your company breaches the AMA, you cannot win
the honor for several years and your term will finish.
Criminal sanctions are available only when the JFTC
makes an accusation. The prosecutor then decides whether
to make an indictment or not.
Issue of the surcharge system
The main problem facing enforcement is the surcharge
system, which has a number of problems and is the subject
of reform.
First, there has recently been a case which used all three
enforcement measures. In the Seal cartel case, the
companies paid a fine, restitution (substantially similar to
damages) and a surcharge. In such cases the companies pay
most of the illegally gained profit in restitution. Therefore,
for practical purposes, the surcharge functions as a
sanction. When the surcharge system was created, damages
claims and criminal sanctions were not used, but the
situation has changed.
Second, the present surcharge system does not have a
leniency program and the amount is not high enough to
deter cartels. Third, the surcharge can apply only to certain
cartels and not to private monopolization, which is as bad
as a cartel. Therefore, the government is currently
considering the reform of the surcharge system.
• This article is taken from a lecture delivered at the
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on March 14,
2005.
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